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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
FRED K. STOCKS and BRENDA K. 
STOCKS, 
Plaintiffs - Appellants, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, a Corporation 
and THE TALBERT CORPORATION, a 
Corporation, 
Defendants - Appellees. 
Case No. 990624-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
The Order Granting Defendant USF&G's Motion to Dismiss (R. 412-414) and the 
Judgment of Dismissal (R. 415-419), which granted The Talbert Corporation's Motion 
to Dismiss, were both signed on June 11 and entered on June 16, 1999. No post-
judgment motions were filed. Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on July 15, 1999. The 
notice was filed within thirty days of entry of the orders appealed from and was timely 
under Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). The Supreme Court poured the 
case over to the Court of Appeals by Order dated November 2, 1999. The Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Where an insurer breaches its obligation to provide a defense to a closely 
held corporation under a liability policy, do the sole shareholders of that corporation, who 
are also named insureds under the same policy, have a cause of action against the insurer 
for monies expended to provide a defense for the corporation and for related consequen-
tial damages? 
2. Do individuals who contract with and rely upon the expertise of an 
insurance agent to obtain appropriate liability coverage for themselves and their wholly 
owned corporation have a right of action against the agent to recover for monies 
expended and for related consequential damages caused by the agent's failure to obtain 
appropriate insurance for the corporation? 
These issues were decided by summary judgment1 and are reviewed for 
correctness. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 
(Utah 1989). The claims were raised in plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 1-12) and argued in 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Talbert's Motion to Dismiss (R. 133-360) and 
in plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to USF&G's Motion to Dismiss (R. 363-397). 
1
 USF&G filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment. The 
Talbert Corporation filed a motion to dismiss. Each motion, however, presented matters 
outside the pleadings which were not excluded by the court. The rulings should, 
therefore, be considered as rulings on a motion for summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(c). 
2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Appellants do not contend that there are any constitutional provisions, statutes or 
rules whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil 
action. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Stocks filed a Verified 
Complaint on December 12, 1997. (R. 1-12.) USF&G filed a Motion to Dismiss or 
Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment asserting three grounds for dismissal: (1) lack 
of standing; (2) res judicata; and (3) statute of limitations. (R. 20-21.) Talbert also filed 
a Motion to Dismiss, asserting (1) statute of limitations; (2) lack of standing; and (3) 
waiver and estoppel. (R. 96-97.) 
Oral argument on the motions was held August 19, 1998. (R. 408.) On February 
22, 1999, the court issued a written ruling, ruling against the defendants on the res 
judicata claims but in favor of the defendants on the claim of lack of standing. The court 
did not reach the other issues raised in the motions. (R. 408-411.) Formal orders 
granting the motions were entered on June 16, 1998. (R. 412-414, 415-419.) 
C. Statement of Facts. Viewed in the light most favorable to Stocks, the record 
suports the following facts: 
Fred and Brenda Stocks are the sole shareholders of Timber Products, Inc. Fred 
is President and Brenda is Secretary/Treasurer. (R. 1-2, f f 1-2.) Timber Products was 
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engaged in the business of harvesting, hauling, milling and marketing timber and timber 
products in San Juan County, Utah. (R. 3, f 8.) 
Stocks had a long-standing business relationship with The Talbert Corporation, and 
insurance agency which Stocks relied upon to provide appropriate insurance for Stocks 
and their businesses. Brenda Stocks would periodically review the insurance 
requirements with Mel Hardenbrook, an employee of The Talbert Corporation, and would 
rely on Talbert to obtain appropriate insurance to meet those requirements. (R. 174-175.) 
Talbert furnished Stocks insurance from Maryland Casualty Company. (R. 140.) After 
Maryland decided to no longer provide coverage, Talbert placed Stocks' insurance with 
USF&G. Talbert was also an appointed agent of USF&G. (R. 2, 1f 4.) Talbert initially 
obtained a USF&G policy for Stocks and their companies on June 20, 1991, and the 
policy was renewed annually thereafter. (R. 141, f. 7.) The named insureds under the 
policy were Timber Products, Inc.; Southern Paving Co.; Timber Products; and Fred and 
Brenda Stocks, Individually. (R. 237.) 
On or about May 12, 1992, Timber Products entered into a timber contract with 
members of the Paul Redd Family to harvest certain timber on land owned by Redds. 
(R. 142, f 8.) Brenda Stocks specically advised Talbert of the insurance requirements 
of the proposed contract, asking Talbert's assurance that Stocks and their companies had 
the insurance required by the contract. (R. 142-143.) The timber contract required that 
Timber Products obtain liability insurance, that Timber Products hold the Redds harmless 
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from any claims (R. 44-45), and that Timber Products pay for any fire damage caused 
by its operations (54-55). 
Unknown to Stocks, and although their contract with Redds specifically required 
fire coverage, page 52 of the 102-page USF&G policy contained an endorsement 
(CG2254) which purported to exclude liability coverage for damage due to fire. (R. 
150.) Other provisions of the policy, however, provided coverage for insured contract 
obligations. (R. 149.) The insurance summary gave no direct warning of any limitation 
on fire liabilty coverage for logging operations, but stated: "Certain Logging and 
Lumbering Operations - See Endorsement CG2254 in policy." (R. 241.) There was no 
hint in the insurance summary that Endorsement CG254 might defeat the fire damage 
coverage. Indeed, the final page of the insurance summary, which specifically listed 
coverages not provided, did not mention that fire coverage was excluded. (R. 246.) The 
insureds were charged a premium of $20,640.00 for the policy. (R. 248.) 
Although the policy period commenced June 30, 1993, Stocks did not receive a 
copy of the policy until about May 9, 1994, only a month before the fire which gave rise 
to this action and during the busiest part of Stocks' work season. (R. 255.) Stocks 
testified they were never informed of the purported exclusion of fire coverage, and that 
they would not have consented to it. (R. 171-172, 367 f 6.) Stocks believed that they 
had purchased appropriate liability insurance, including coverage for loss caused by fire. 
(R. 173-174.) The risk of damage caused by fire was the single greatest risk of Timber 
Products. (R. 367 1 6.) 
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A forest fire occurred on June 14, 1994, while the USF&G policy was in force. 
(R. 5.) Following the fire, Paul D. Redd made a claim for damages addressed to "Fred 
and Brenda Stocks, Timber Products, Inc." (R. 123-126.) San Juan County also made 
a claim for damages related to the fire, which claim was addressed to "Timber Products, 
Fred and Brenda Stocks, Owner." (R. 127-128.) 
Stocks promptly and timely gave notice of the claims to Talbert and USF&G, but 
USF&G denied coverage. (R. 6, f 17; 354-356.) Stocks presented evidence that the 
denial of coverage was made in bad faith, i.e., that USF&G failed to adequately 
investigate the cause of the fire, and that coverage existed under several clauses of the 
policy not affected by the ambiguous fire exclusion but USF&G nonetheless denied 
coverage. (E.g., R. 181-182; 284-304, 334-335.) As a result of the denial of coverage, 
Stocks were required to finance Timber Products in defending itself from the claims. 
Stocks were also required to finance litigation seeking to establish coverage for the 
claims. Stocks also suffered emotional injury, including the loss of peace of mind and 
the emotional distress relating to the denial of coverage. (R. 7-8.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
An individual has standing to pursue individual claims. A claim is individual, and 
not derivative of a corporate claim, where the harm is to the individual as such, rather 
than solely because of shareholder status. The claims of Stocks were individual. Stocks 
were required to individually fund the defense of the claims against their corporation. 
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Stocks also suffered individual emotional and other consequential damages related to the 
loss of coverage and from being required to fund the claim defense. Stocks had standing 
to pursue these individual claims. 
Stocks' claims relating to the purchase of the insurance were also individual. The 
insurance sales agent, Talbert, owed stocks a fiduciary duty to obtain appropriate 
insurance coverage for Stocks and their businesses, including Timber Products. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STOCKS HAVE STANDING TO RECOVER THEIR PERSONAL DAMAGES 
RESULTING FROM FUNDING THE CLAIMS DEFENSE 
THAT USF&G REFUSED TO PROVIDE. 
Fred and Brenda Stocks purchased liability insurance for themselves and their 
business. When the insurance company refused to defend a claim against the business, 
Stocks were required to fund the claim defense. This case thus presents the issue of 
whether the owners of an insured corporation who are required to fund the defense of an 
insured claim have a cause of action against the breaching insurer for recovery of their 
distinct economic damages and their damages for deprivation of the peace of mind benefit 
provided by insurance. The trial court held Stocks lacked standing to assert these 
personal claims. 
Standing is a jurisdictional issue which considers whether a person has a sufficient 
interest in a controversy to bring a lawsuit. The Utah Supreme Court has noted that 
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standing issues often turn on the facts of a case and that generalizations about standing 
to sue are largely worthless as such." Kennecott Corp v. Salt Lake County. 702 P.2d 
451, 453 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted, quotation marks omitted). The Court has 
nonetheless developed the following test for standing: 
1. We first apply traditional standing criteria, 
which require that (a) the interests of the parties be adverse, 
and (b) the parties seeking relief have a legally protectible 
interest in the controversy. Plaintiff must be able to show 
that he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury that 
gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. 
2. If the plaintiff has no standing under the first 
step, then he may have standing if no one has a greater 
interest than he and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at all 
if the plaintiff is denied standing. 
3. In unique cases, standing may be established by 
a showing that the issues raised by the plaintiff are of great 
public importance and ought to be judicially resolved. 
Kennecott, 702 P.2d at 454 (citing Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983) (citations 
and quotation marks omitted). 
Plaintiffs satisfy the first requirement, because they have "suffered some distinct 
and palpable injury that gives [them] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal 
dispute." Kennecott. 702 P.2d at 454. 
The second alternative of Kennecott is also satisfied. The issues raised by 
plaintiffs are unlikely to be raised at all if the plaintiffs are denied standing. Many of the 
potential consequential damages flowing from a breach of the duty to defend could be 
realistically asserted only by an individual, not a corporation: 
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In an action for breach of a duty to bargain in good faith, a 
broad range of recoverable damages is conceivable, par-
ticularly given the unique nature and purpose of an insurance 
contract. An insured frequently faces catastrophic conse-
quences if funds are not available within a reasonable period 
of time to cover an insured loss; damages for losses well in 
excess of the policy limits, such as for a home or a business, 
may therefore be foreseeable and provable. See, e.g., 
Reichert v. General Insurance Co., 59 Cal.Rptr. 724, 728, 
428 P.2d 860, 864 (1967), vacated on other grounds, 68 
Cal.2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 69 Cal.Rptr. 321 (1968) (because 
bankruptcy was a foreseeable consequence of fire insurer's 
failure to pay, insurer was liable for consequential damages 
flowing from bankruptcy). Furthermore, it is axiomatic that 
insurance frequently is purchased not only to provide funds in 
case of loss, but to provide peace of mind for the insured or 
his beneficiaries. Therefore, although other courts adopting 
the contract approach have been reluctant to allow such an 
award, Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 392 
A.2d at 581-82, we find no difficulty with the proposition 
that, in unusual cases, damages for mental anguish might be 
provable. See Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance 
Co., 409 Mich, at 440-55, 295 N.W.2d at 64-72 (Williams, 
J., dissenting); cf. Lambert v. Sine. 123 Utah 145, 150, 256 
P.2d 241, 244 (1953). The foreseeability of any such 
damages will always hinge upon the nature and language of 
the contract and the reasonable expectations of the parties. J. 
Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 14-5 at 523-25 (2d ed. 
1977). 
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985). 
In Campbell v. State Farm, 840 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Court of 
Appeals held that in third party bad faith actions, the insured's recoverable damages 
include deprivation of the peace of mind benefit which should have been provided by the 
liability insurance, e.g., escape from fear of economic catastrophe. 
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The basic facts Stocks will prove in support of their complaint are: (1) Timber 
Products is a small business wholly and solely owned by the Stocks who are its share-
holders, directors, officers and agents and who must guarantee and have had to personally 
guarantee its debt and see to the performance of its contracts; (2) Timber Products is not 
a sufficiently viable economic entity by applicable commercial standards to enable it to 
obtain the financing required to operate its highly cash intensive business without personal 
guarantees and has little, if any, independent financial existence and is in substance an 
"incorporated proprietorship", so viewed by the commercial world; (3) economic damage, 
separate and distinct to the Stocks personally has and will be suffered directly and 
personally to the Stocks as the direct and foreseeable consequence of wrongful denial of 
coverage/refusal to defend; and (4) Defendants' refusal to defend has destroyed Stocks' 
peace of mind and caused them to suffer substantial mental and emotional distress. 
The consequence of the trial court ruling is that the insurance company and the 
selling agent are entitled to be shielded from liability for a substantial part of the damages 
caused by their breaches, including wrongful denial of coverage, refusal to defend, and 
breach of fiduciary duties to provide adequate available insurance coverage, simply 
because Stocks' business was incorporated and only the corporation was made a defendant 
in the fire damage suits. 
Moore v. Energy Mutual Insurance Co.. 814 P.2d 1141 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
emphasized that the consequential damages to be awarded for breach of an insurance 
contract are such that are "reasonably foreseeable at the time of contract." Accord 
10 
Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 32 (June 1, 1999) (expressly 
adopting the foreseeability rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts). It cannot 
be questioned that the personal consequences to the Stocks were foreseeable; in fact, they 
were almost certain. If a closely held business is hit with a large claim because a selling 
agent fails to write appropriate insurance coverage, emotional injuries to the live persons 
behind the corporation is likely. If an insurer fails to defend a covered claim, it is 
reasonably certain that the individuals will be required to provide financial assistance to 
the corporation to make a defense. To deny Stocks standing to assert these personal 
claims will result in the defendants escaping liability for a substantial portion of the harms 
caused by their breaches. 
Cases confirm the existence of standing. The Utah Court of Appeals 
acknowledged "a well-recognized exception to the general rule that allows a shareholder 
to bring an individual cause of action if the harm to the corporation also damaged the 
shareholder as an individual rather than as a shareholder." DLB Collection Trust v. 
Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 596 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). One of the cases cited by the DLB 
court was Empire Life Insurance Co. of America v. Valdak Corp.. 468 F.2d 330, 335 
(5th Cir. 1972). Defendant obtained a $350,000 loan from Plaintiff, secured by shares 
in National Insurance Company. Plaintiff later acquired National; at that time the 
pledged shares had a value of $1,200,000. When plaintiff later declared the note past due 
and sold the shares, they had a value of only $162,500. Defendant claimed that plaintiff 
had a duty to properly manage National and to not deplete its assets. The plaintiff 
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asserted the duty was owned only to National itself, not to its shareholders individually. 
The court held: 
Here, the defendant seeks damages as a pledgor. The 
fact that his pledge is stock and that if the manipulated 
depreciation of the stock is proven would also give rise to a 
derivative suit by defendant as stockholder should not fore-
close the suit as pledgor. The role of pledgor and stockholder 
are not identical and defendant may play the part he chooses; 
when the curtain drops, the facts will invite finis. We find 
that defendant has alleged facts that, if proven, would state a 
good cause of action for intentional depletion of the collateral 
and is entitled to bring his claim as individual pledgor. 
468 F.2d at 336 (italics original). 
Wilson v. Askew, 709 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Ark. 1989), also supports recovery 
here. The case involved a claim by a individual owning 50% of the stock in a 
corporation against the owner of the remaining 50% and others. The plaintiff claimed 
the defendants had misappropriated the funds of the corporation for their personal gain 
to defraud plaintiff of his investment. The defendants claimed the plaintiff lacked 
standing to sue because the true injuries were to the corporation. The court held: 
Defendants contend that plaintiff lacks standing to sue 
because the true injuries are to Perforaciones Alto Mar and 
plaintiffs claim is derivative. This would be the case if 
plaintiff sought only to assert his rights as a shareholder. 
However, plaintiff quite clearly asserts injury to himself 
separate and apart from his statue as a shareholder, and as so 
limited there is no problem occasioned by the failure to join 
the corporation as a party. Specifically, plaintiff alleges 
investing three and one-half million dollars into the corpora-
tion of which he was a shareholder. The loss of the initial 
investment, as opposed to the right to share in the profits, is 
an individual injury, not a corporate one. 
12 
709 F. Supp. at 153. 
Similarly, in this case Stocks seek to recover, among other things, the money they 
have expended to provide the defense which USF&G refused to provide. This claim is 
the same conceptually as the loss of the initial investment in Wilson. Stocks' damage 
from funding the claim defense is personal in nature. The claim arises because Stocks 
contributed the money for the defense, not because Stocks are shareholders in Timber 
Products. 
Similarly, in Mason v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.. 888 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. 
Texas 1995), the court found a personal injury where the stockholder had pledged 
personal stock in order to obtain a letter of credit for the corporation, and allowed the 
stockholder to maintain a suit claiming there had been a wrongful draw on the letter of 
credit. 
Heyden v. Safeco Title Insurance Co.. 498 N.W. 2d 905 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) 
held a corporate insured's sole shareholder, who was not a holder of record title to the 
insured property, had a sufficient relationship to the insured property that he would be 
reasonably expected to suffer loss by its destruction or to derive benefit from its contin-
ued existence (an insurable interest), hence was a proper party plaintiff entitled to 
maintain an action, along with his insured corporation, against the insurer for recovery 
of compensatory and punitive damages arising from wrongful refusal to pay insurance 
benefits. Here not only Stocks' business entity but Stocks' personal assets outside Timber 
Products may be totally consumed by reason of wrongful insurer refusal to defend. 
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It is true, as the trial court held, that some of the harm suffered by Stocks comes 
as a result of their stock ownership. For example, the economic viability of Timber 
Products has been adversely impacted by USF&G's failure to defend. Although this 
reduced the value of plaintiff s shares in Timber Products, the claim properly belongs to 
the corporation. But that does not mean that all of Stocks' injuries are derivative. The 
money paid to provide a defense for Timber Products is a personal claim, as are the 
related emotional and financial damages Stocks personally suffered as a consequence of 
spending money they did not have, to enable the corporation to defend the claims. Stocks 
have standing to pursue those claims. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE PERSONAL CLAIMS AGAINST 
TALBERT AND USF&G RESULTING FROM TALBERT'S 
BREACH OF ITS DUTY TO OBTAIN ADEQUATE 
COVERAGE FOR STOCKS' COMPANIES. 
Stocks' Verified Complaint alleges that insurance agent Talbert owed Stocks, in 
their individual capacities, a duty to make sure the comprehensive general liability 
insurance obtained from USF&G by Talbert provided Stocks and their companies, 
including Timber Products, broad form, all risk, clear, unambiguous coverage for all 
those companies' significant insurable risks. Those risks, for Timber Products, included 
coverage for property damage arising from fires relating to Timber Products' timbering 
business. The complaint alleges that Talbert's breach of that duty visited unique 
personal, economic and mental distress damages upon the Stocks. (R. 8-10.) 
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Stocks presented sworn testimony, and are entitled to prove at trial, that Talbert 
owed them a fiduciary duty by reason of the long established relationship. Because of 
that fiduciary duty, Talbert had the duty to ascertain the insurance needs of Stocks and 
their companies, including Timber Products, and to provide proper insurance covering 
those needs. Talbert also had a fiduciary duty to advise Stocks of any significant 
limitation is coverage, and specifically had the duty to advise Stocks that the insurance 
provided for Timber Products did not cover the most significant risk faced by Timber 
Products. For breach of that duty Stocks have a cause of action against Talbert for 
recovery of all damages incurred by Stocks personally and individually arising from 
Talbert's failure to provide the clear, unambiguous insurance actually meeting the Stocks' 
needs available on the market. 
An insurance agent has an affirmative duty to shop the insurance market to 
ascertain the availability of coverage needed by the client. See First Alabama Bank. 
N.A. v. First State Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1990). A large number of cases 
hold insurance brokers and agents are liable for the insured's damages resulting from 
failure to obtain proper insurance. See cases cited in Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, 
Liability of Insurance Broker or Agent for Failure to Procure Insurance, 64 A.L.R. 3d 
398 (1975), and in Thomas J. Goger, Annotation, Liability of Insurance Agent or Broker 
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on Grounds of Inadequacy of Liability Insurance Coverage Procured. 72 A.L.R. 3d 704 
(1976).2 
Stocks' arguments made under Point I above are equally applicable to Talbert. 
Talbert is not entitled to benefit from the happenstance that the fire liability claims have 
been asserted only against Timber Products since Stocks personally are and have been 
foreseeably impacted by the failure of Talbert to obtain adequate insurance and the 
insurer's wrongful refusal to defend. 
CONCLUSION 
Because USF&G refused to defend Timber Products, Stocks were required to fund 
a defense. Providing that funding caused them severe and foreseeable economic, 
emotional, and other consequential damages. These damages result from their having to 
provide a defense where USF&G failed to do so, and not from their status as stock-
holders. Stocks have standing to pursue those claims. 
Talbert and its principal, USF&G, owed a fiduciary duty to Stocks to provide 
adequate insurance for all of Stocks' companies. Because failure to obtain proper 
insurance would damage Stocks personally, Stocks had a personal claim for breach of that 
duty. 
2 In general, an agent's liability for failure to obtain proper insurance is to 
provide the coverage that should have been provided by the policy. Pete's Satire. Inc. 
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.. 698 P.2d 1388, 1390-91 (Ct. App. 1985), aff d sub nom. 
Bayly. Martin & Fay. Inc. v. Pete's Satire. Inc.. 739 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1987). 
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This Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, and 
remand this case for trial on the merits. 
DATED this AS^day of November, 1999. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Ruling on USF&G and The Talbert Corportion Motions to Dismiss (R. 408-411) 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRED K. STOCKS, and BRENDA 
K. STOCKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND : 
GUARANTY COMPANY, a : 
corporation, and THE TALBERT : 
CORPORATION, a corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
: RULING ON USF&G AND THE 
: TALBERT CORPORATION MOTIONS 
: TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 9707-87 
Oral argument on the two Motions to Dismiss were heard on 
August 19, 1998. The court took the motions and responses under 
advisement, and now issues this ruling. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The court entered an order on July 14, 1998, in Timber 
Products v. Redd, et al. , Civil No. 940700057, denying Timber 
Product's Motion to Intervene and Motion Granting Leave to File and 
Serve a Third Amended Complaint. The motions were denied for the 
reasons that the court found that (1) the motions were untimely, 
and (2) Utah law prohibits a shareholder of a corporation from 
bringing a suit in his individual capacity as a shareholder for the 
wrong done to the corporation by a third person. An interlocutory 
appeal was filed but denied by the Utah Supreme Court. The Stocks 
then filed their Complaint in this action. 
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II. REASONS FOR MOTIONS 
USF&G claims that Plaintiffs are barred from filing the 
present action by (1) the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion, (2) a three-year statute of limitation, and (3) the 
claim that individual shareholders do not have a standing as 
individuals to bring an action for a wrong done by a third party to 
the corporation. 
Talbert's motion asserts that (1) the Complaint is barred 
by the three-year statute of limitation, (2) by the rule that 
shareholders of corporations cannot bring an action in their own 
name for damage to their corporation, and (3) by waiver and 
estoppel. 
III. RULING 
A. Res Judicata: The court finds that the denial of he 
Motion to Intervene and denial of Motion for Leave to File a Third 
Amended Complaint was not an adjudication on the merits nor was it 
a final judgment, and therefore the doctrine of res judicata does 
not apply. 
B. Standing to Sue: The general rule is that 
shareholders of a corporation may not bring suit in their 
individual capacities for a wrong done by a third party to the 
corporation. An exception to that rule provides that a shareholder 
my bring an individual cause of action if the harm to the 
corporation also damages the shareholder as an individual rather 
3 
than a shareholder. This exception is limited, however, to those 
situations in which the wrong itself amounts to a violation of a 
duty arising from a contract or otherwise, and owed directly to the 
shareholder personally. 
Although Plaintiffs are names insureds on the insurance 
policy, no action has been filed against them personally by anyone 
after the fire of June, 1994. Moreover, neither Defendant USF&G or 
Talbert has been asked to provide a defense or indemnity to 
Plaintiffs. Hence, Plaintiffs face no exposure and their claims, 
including the claims for emotional distress, are entirely 
derivative of the claims made against the corporation. Their 
injuries are not separate and distinct from those suffered by the 
corporation. The Plaintiffs therefore lack standing in their 
individual capacities to bring this action. 
Because the court has found that the Plaintiffs have no 
standing to sue, the court does not address the remaining issues. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint is ordered dismissed. 
DATED this / ?f day of February, 1999. 
SKTCE/K/. BRYNER" 
District Court Judget 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 1999, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON USF&G AND THE 
TALBERT CORPORATION MOTIONS TO DISMISS was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Gary L. Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
50 South Main, 7th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Ray G. Martineau 
Attorney at Law 
3 098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Michael L. Deamer 
Attorney at Law 
139 East South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
{^PjJLlW 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
individuals needing special accommodations (including 
communicative aids and services) during this proceeding 
should call 1-800-992-1072, at least THREE working 
days prior to the scheduled proceeding. 
APPENDIX "B" 
Order Granting Defendant USF&G's Motion to Dismiss (R. 412-414) 
GARY L. JOHNSON [A4353] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant USF&G 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRED K. STOCKS; and BRENDA K. 
STOCKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, a Corporation; 
and THE TALBERT CORPORATION, a 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
USF&G'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 9707-87 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings filed by all parties concerning USF&G's 
Motion to Dismiss, and the Court having heard oral argument on the issue and having taken the 
matter under advisement, rules as follows: 
o~\/Ei\f;~! D.:SYri:w7 CCUi 
8r.fi Ji ?r\ Cojntv 
ih^c:^' 
5£ 
USF&G's Motion to Dismiss is granted for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling 
on USF&G and The Talbert Corporation's Motions to Dismiss issued by the Court on February 19, 
1999. Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this /' day of. , 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
-jfgUggfc. 
( V^/<3£. 
HONORABLE BRYCE K 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this j ? 5 ^ d a y of February, 1999, to the following: 
Ray G. Martineau, Esq. 
Anthony R. Martineau, Esq. 
3098 Highland Driver, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Michael L. Deamer, Esq. 
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE 
139 East South Temple, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant The Talbert Corporation 
240606 
bjm:2/25/99 
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APPENDIX "C" 
Judgment of Dismissal (R. 415-419) 
SEVENTH DISTR.C7C0UR", 
San Jur-n Countv 
^
ED
 Mi i 6 13S5 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844 
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR, McCONKIE & LEE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant The Talbert Corporation 
139 East South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
Facsimile: (801) 531-0444 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRED K. STOCKS and BRENDA K. 
STOCKS, 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, a corporation, : 
and THE TALBERT CORPORATION, 
a corporation, : Civil No. 9707-87 
Defendants. : Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The Motion of Defendant The Talbert Corporation to Dismiss together with other motions 
came on for hearing before the above-entitled court on August 19,1998 with Michael L. Deamer, 
Esq. appearing on behalf of Defendant The Talbert Corporation, Ray G. Martineau, Esq. 
appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs, and Gary L. Johnson, Esq. appearing on behalf of USF&G, and 
other parties being present but not formally appearing, and the court having heard argument of 
CLEhK Or THE COURT 
B Y _ _ 
DEPUTY X 
counsel, having reviewed the memorandums of points and authorities, the pleadings and affidavits 
of the parties and being fully advised in the premises, hereby FINDS: 
1. This court on July 14, 1998 in Timber Products v. Redd, et al.. Civil No. 
940700057, denied Timber Products' Motion to Intervene and Motion Granting Leave to File and 
Serve a Third Amended Complaint for and on behalf of Plaintiffs Fred K. Stocks and Brenda K. 
Stocks on the grounds that said motions were untimely and that Utah law prohibits the shareholder 
of a corporation from bringing suit in his individual capacity as a shareholder for a wrong done 
to his corporation by a third person. An Interlocutory Appeal was filed but denied by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
2. Plaintiffs Fred K. Stocks and Brenda K. Stocks then commenced the present action 
asserting among other things intentional infliction of emotional distress for Defendants Talbert 
(and USF&G's) failure to provide insurance defense to their corporation in the above-cited Timber 
Products v. Redd case. 
3. Defendant Talbert moved to dismiss the Complaint (1) as barred by Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-21-313(1) as beyond the applicable statute of limitations and (2) on the grounds that 
shareholders of corporations cannot bring actions in their individual names for damages done to 
their corporations by third parties. 
4. The court finds the denial of the Motion to Intervene and Denial of Motion for 
Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint in the Timber Products v. Redd case was not an 
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adjudication on the merits nor final judgment and therefore the doctrine of res judicata does not 
apply. 
5. The court further finds that although Plaintiffs are named insureds on the insurance 
policy with USF&G, no action has been filed against Plaintiffs personally by anyone arising out 
of the fire of June 1994. 
6. Neither Defendant USF&G nor Talbert has been asked by the individual Plaintiffs 
to provide a defense or indemnity to the Plaintiffs in their individual capacities. 
7. Plaintiffs therefore face no legal exposure and their claims including claims for 
emotional distress are entirely derivative of the claims made against the corporation and any 
alleged injuries are not separate or distinct from those suffered by their corporation. 
8. Plaintiffs Fred K. Stock and Brenda K. Stocks therefore lack standing in their 
individual capacities to bring the action, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant Talbert's 
Motion to Dismiss be and the same is hereby granted in that Plaintiffs in their individual capacities 
have no standing to sue as shareholders for an alleged wrong done to their corporation by third 
persons. The court declines to address the remaining issues raised by Talbert's Motion. Judgment 
of dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint against Defendant The Talbert Corporation is hereby granted 
and so ordered. 
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DATED this / / day of 44*^ , 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
^C£^ 
i Honorabl&TBryce K 
LJ|District^fourt Judge 
lichael L. Deamer 
Attorneys for Defendant The Talbert 
Corporation 
By_ 
Ray G. Martineau 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration that a 
true and correct photocopy of the foregoing Judgment of Dismissal was submitted to: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Plaintiffs Counsel 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
on February 24, 1999 via facsimile transmission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL, this jf day of March, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Gary L. Johnson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant USF&G 
Key Bank Tower, 7th Floor 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
20mldpj\2003 
5 
